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FEDERAL PROCEDURE-INTERLOCUTORY .APPEALS-APPEALABILITY OF STAY
OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 1292 OF THE JUDICIAL CODE-Plaintiff
brought an action for an accounting of the profits of a joint adventure.
The defendant moved to stay proceedings pending arbitration pursuant
to section 3 of the United States Arbitration Act.1 This motion was denied
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and defendant appealed the ruling, claiming as justification for the
appeal that an interlocutory order denying a stay was a denial of an
injunction under section 1292 of the Judicial Code.2 The court of appeals
dismissed the appeal. On certiorari to the Supreme Court, held, affirmed,
two justices dissenting. A stay of proceedings in a suit where plaintiff's
action is equitable in nature is not an injunction but only a decision as
to how to try the one suit pending before the court. Baltimore Contractors,
Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. ·176, 75 S.Ct. 249 (1955).
A basic limit on federal appellate jurisdiction is that appeals will be
allowed only from final judgments.3 By express statutory exception, review
of interlocutory orders is permissible, but only if the order fits within
the narrow classifications provided by Congress in section 1292. The
question of whether a district court's stay of all or part of the proceedings
before it is an injunction within the meaning of section 1292 has caused
considerable discussion.4 The principal case seems to make clear that,
despite the merger of law and equity in federal procedure,5 the Supreme
Court will look to the legal or equitable nature of the claims involved to
determine whether such a stay is appealable. When the plaintiff's suit
is of the common law type and the defendant moves for a stay on the
basis of an equitable defense, the district court's action on the motion
will be the granting or denial of an injunction.6 This result is reached
by analogy to common law practice where the defendant in a law action
would go into equity as a plaintiff and ask the chancellor to enjoin the
law proceedings in order to hear first the law defendant's equitable claim.7
On the other hand, appeal before final judgment is not allowed if the
defendant's motion for a stay is based on a claim which would have
been within the jurisdiction of the law court.8 Nor will it be allowed
where the original suit is of an equitable nature, regardless of whether
the defense interposed is legal9 or equitable.10 The use of this historical
2 "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from: (1) Interlocutory
orders ••• granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing
to dissolve or modify injunctions. . • ." 28 U.S.C. (1952) §1292.
3 28 U.S.C. (1952) §1291. See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 65 S.Ct. 631 (1945).
4See MOORE, COMMENTARY ON TIIE U.S.·JUDICIAL CODE 492 (1949); 48 MICH. L. REv.
358 (1950).
5 Rule 2, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. (1952).
6 This was the result reached in Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379,
55 S.Ct. 310 (1935), and Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 317 U.S. 188, 63 S.Ct.
163 (1942), cases involving a stay of plaintiff's right to a jury trial in order to hear first
the equitable defense. To the effect that a defense setting up an arbitration agreement
is equitable in nature and that a motion to stay plaintiff's legal action pending arbitration is an injunction, see Shanferoke Coal &: Supply Corp. v. Westchester Service Corp.,
293 U.S. 449, 55 S.Ct. 313 (1935); Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, (6th Cir. 1944) 142 F. (2d) 876.
'1 See the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Morgantown v. Royal Ins.
Co., 337 U.S. 254, 69 S.Ct. 1067 (1949).
s See American Airlines, Inc. v. Forman, (3d Cir. 1953) 204 F. (2d) 230; Dowling
Bros. Distilling Co. v. United States, (6th Cir. 1946) 153 F. (2d) 353, cert. den. 328
U.S. 848, 66 S.Ct. 1120 (1946).
9 Morgantown v. Royal Ins. Co., note 7 supra.
10 This was the situation in the principal case.
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analogy to allow interlocutory appeals from some stay orders may be
criticized on several grounds. Divorced as it is from the factual reality
that there is only one form of action in the federal system, its effect is
to place another stumbling block in the path of effective merger of law
and equity.11 Furthermore, allowing some stay orders to be appealed disregards the well guarded policy against piecemeal appeals.12 It is true
that there has been some liberalization of the final judgment rule both
by judicial interpretation13 and by the interlocutory appeals statute, but
this has been in cases where requiring one of the parties to delay appeal
until final disposition of the case would cause irreparable harm.14 In
most cases involving a stay of proceedings the rights of the parties can be
effectively protected by an appeal following final judgment. The only
hardship suffered is the expense and delay of going through a trial before
being able to appeal. This has not yet been recognized as sufficient reason
to disregard the rule against piecemeal appeals, although legislation has
been urged which would allow appeals where the decision of a debatable
pre-trial question might prevent long and expensive litigation. 15 It has
also been suggested that the prerogative writs16 may be used to allow
review where postponement of appeal until final judgment would cause
undue hardship and expense.17 This points up another weakness of the
reasoning employed in the principal case; it makes no allowance· for the
hardship which might be caused by delay in individual cases. Rather it
allows or disallows appeal strictly on the basis of the technical arrangement of the claims. It is clear, however, that the Court itself realizes
the fallacies of employing this historical distinction. 18 Thus the principal
case may be regarded only as an example of the Court's reluctance to
overrule a line of precedent. One thing seems certain; any change in
the criteria used in determining the appealability of stay orders will have
to be initiated by Congress.
Lawrence W. Sperling, S.Ed.

11 48 MICH. L. REv. 358 (1950). See also Beaunit Mills, Inc. v. Eday Fabric Sales
Corp., (2d Cir. 1942) 124 F. (2d) 563.
12 CLARK, CODE PLEADING, 2d ed., 124 (1948).
13 For an analysis of the judicial exceptions to the final judgment rule see 28
N.Y. UNIV. L. REv. 203 (1953); Underwood, "Appeals in the Federal Practice from
Collateral Orders," 36 VA. L. REv. 731 (1950).
14 Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221 (1949).
For an impressive showing that this was the reason for the statute allowing appeals
from interlocutory injunctions see Porter, "Appeals from Interlocutory and Final Decrees
in the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal," 19 BoST. UNIV. L. REv. 377 (1939).
15 See REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, Sept. 24-25,
1953, p. 27; Moore and Vestal, "Present and Potential Role of Certification in Federal
Appellate Procedure," 35 VA. L. REv. I at 45 (1949).
16 See 28 U.S.C. (1952) §1651.
17 See 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 2d ed., 743 (1951).
18 "The incongruity of taking jurisdiction from a stay in a law type and denying
jurisdiction in an equity type proceeding springs from the persistence of outmoded
procedural differentiations." Principal case at 184.

